Is it possible for Ukraine to create a nuclear weapon to thwart Russia's military advancement?
In a thought-provoking exercise, Dr. Alexander Bollfrass, a renowned nuclear arms expert, pondered the feasibility of Ukraine manufacturing nuclear bombs as a potential deterrent against Russia's aggression. This interrogation led to a series of intriguing hypotheticals and implications for the embattled democracy.
Bollfrass, head of strategy, technology, and arms control at the esteemed International Institute for Strategic Studies, played out this scenario to anticipate the potential outcomes of a hypothetical Ukrainian attempt to craft an atomic bomb and ensure its use as a perennial peace guardian.
To construct these war and peace simulations, Bollfrass drew on Ukraine's existing access to plutonium and uranium and its current missile expertise. Although Ukraine no longer possesses intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), it still manages a variety of cruise missiles that could potentially be modified to carry strategic warheads.
Ukraine's nuclear reactors, controlled by the leadership, could potentially drain uranium for enrichment purposes. However, Bollfrass points out that Ukraine's stockpiled plutonium, amassed at the infamous Chernobyl reactor site, could be utilized to construct at least one atomic bomb.
Yet, any attempt to siphon off fissile material undetected would be quickly thwarted by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). As Bollfrass explains, the IAEA's inspectors would swiftly identify the diversion of reactor fuel or plutonium into a nuclear weapons program, promptly alerting the Russians.
To preemptively bypass IAEA detection, Ukraine would need to depart from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, eject atomic inspectors, and shroud its highly enriched uranium production facilities from the world's leading intelligence agencies, including Russia's. Bollfrass predicts that such measures would only magnify the clandestine nature of Ukraine's intent to develop a nuclear warhead.
Moreover, Russian intelligence agents would likely exert remarkable efforts to locate and neutralize these facilities. The Kremlin might even opt for a preemptive strike employing nuclear-armed missiles.
Bollfrass posits that to build a credible deterrent, Ukraine must assemble not one device but a small arsenal of fission or fusion bombs. This escalates the likelihood of detection by Moscow and heightens the allure for it to obliterate these weapons before their deployment.
In autumn 2020, President Volodymyr Zelensky appealed for Ukraine's swift admission to NATO during a meeting of the European Council. He expressed regret that his predecessors had relinquished their Soviet-inherited stockpile of nuclear-capped ICBMs in exchange for security guarantees that remained unfulfilled.
Following Ukraine's independence upon the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the pro-West leaders who assumed power inherited nearly 2,000 nuclear-equipped Soviet missiles—one of the largest arsenals worldwide.
As part of an American-backed agreement called the Budapest Memorandum, Russia, the U.S., and the U.K. all agreed to respect Ukraine's borders and independence while providing security assurances to safeguard Ukrainian sovereignty. Additionally, Washington pledged to furnish security guarantees to Ukraine in exchange for its relinquishment of strategic ballistic missiles.
However, the Western world's protection of Ukraine's independence has not been as comprehensive as promised by the Budapest Agreement. This failure to thwart Russia's ongoing blitzkrieg has not only eroded the safety of Ukraine's populace, but it has jeopardized the worldwide campaign to inhibit nuclear proliferation.
Bollfrass underscores the importance of fortifying Ukraine's defenses to uphold its role as a bulwark against Russian expansionism and to underscore that unprovoked aggression backed by nuclear threats is not tolerated. Moreover, he suggests that without credible security guarantees of the kind NATO membership provides, Ukraine might eventually be compelled to seek nuclear self-help.
Nonetheless, Bollfrass conjectures that Zelensky's NATO-or-nuclear ultimatum in the fall was most likely a piece of political theater designed to accelerate his ultimate objective: expedited membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Zelensky, an astute professional with a keen grasp of history and NATO's origins, probably comprehends that West Germany, a nation that once bordered the Soviet bloc and its immense nuclear arsenal, threatened to restart its atomic weapon program as long as it was excluded from NATO.
Ultimately, Zelensky has pledged a commitment not to produce nuclear arms during a joint news conference with NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte in the fall. Furthermore, scholars remind us that concern about German nuclear weapons potential extended back to World War II, when Nazi Germany worked on an atomic bomb project. It wasn't until six years after the establishment of NATO that the Western allies permitted West Germany into the defense coalition, on the condition that Chancellor Konrad Adenauer would avoid developing atomic weapons.
- If Ukraine were to secretly develop a nuclear bomb, it would require Ukraine to breach the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, evict atomic inspectors, and conceal its highly enriched uranium production facilities, all actions that could potentially escalate the situation and attract Russian attention, possibly leading to a preemptive nuclear strike by Russia.
- Despite President Zelensky's appeal for Ukraine's swift admission to NATO in autumn 2020, the failings of the Western world to protect Ukraine's independence as promised by the Budapest Agreement have raised concerns about the possibility of Ukraine seeking nuclear self-help as a credible security measure, echoing the historical precedent of West Germany's nuclear ambitions during its exclusion from NATO.
